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RECOVERY OF PREMIUMS WHEN

p ARTIES MISTAKEN AS TO VALUE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT Plaintiff's intestate, a resident of Georgia, owned items of
jewelry which were located in Germany and which were subject to a death tax
there, intestate having died in Germany. An appraisal was made by a German
court commissioner in assessing the tax and a copy of the appraisal was forwarded
to plaintiff executor, who, relying there12n, effected a policy of insurance with
the defendant covering all the goods, the principal item being a pearl necklace
appraised at $60,000. It was discovered on the safe arrival of the jewelry that
the pearl necklace was worth but $60.00, being composed of cultured pearls.
Plaintiff seeks to recover the premium which was paid for the insurance policy.
Held, plaintiff is not entitled to restitution because it is likely that had the necklace been lost the defendant would never have been able to prove the mistake
and would have had to pay on the basis of the $60,000 valuation. It would be
inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recO'\·er the premium since actually defendant
assumed the risk. Orient Insurance Co. v. Dunlap, 193 Ga. 241, 17 S. E.
(2d) 703 (1941).
Before considering the facts of the instant case it should be noted that mistakes in insurance contracts present characteristic difficulties not ordinarily present in other mistake cases. The contract of insurance is usually initiated by the
insured's statement as to the nature and value of the subject matter and this
statement often determines the terms of the contract and the amount of
premiums. Even though the irisured makes an innocent misstatement, having
induced the mistake, he is at a disadvantage in seeking to recover premiums.1
1 This is the principal point of distinction from the ordinary mistake as to subject matter in sales cases. In sales cases it would seem that as long as the mistake is so
substantial as fundamentally to alter the contract of the parties, relief may be granted.
Chandler v. Lopus, 2 Cro. Jae. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603); Sherwood v. Walker, 66
Mich. 568, 33 N. W. 919 (1887); Cotter v. Luckie, [1918] N. Z. L. R. 8II. In
insurance contracts apparently the mistake must have the effect of destroying the
consideration and result in no risk whatever being assumed. See note 8, infra. The
insurance company may be interested in the value of the subject matter as a warning
of possible fraudulent intentions and it might therefore be argued that the insured
bears the whole risk of correctly stating the value. However, this argument will not
lead to the conclusion that the insured is never entitled to return of excess premiums
since the ground of granting r.elief is that a mistake was made which was so basic as to
thwart the reasonable expectations of the parties. This might well be the result even
though the general rule is that when the risk is consciously assumed no relief for mistake will be given. However, the fact that it is the insured who does ordinarily induce
the mistake makes his position more difficult. But see Mobile County v. London &
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He at least must show that he was not negligent in inducing the mistake.2 Often
the form of the contract is such that the statement is a representation or a warranty, and since it relates to a material fact, it will avoid the policy even though
innocently made. 8 If an insurance company pays out the stipulated value·of the
property insured and it is subsequently discovered that for any reason the insurer was not liable on the policy, it may recover the payment,4 except in cases
where the reason for nonliability was the breach of a condition which the company waived. 5 Thus in the instant case if the jewelry had been destroyed and the
insurance company had paid the face amount of the policy, it could recover from
the insured the amount paid upon subsequently learning the true value of the
necklace. Yet the court held tjlat the plaintiff could not recover the premium.
The mistake made in the present case was as to the value of the subject matter
of the contract, but since value of the subject matter is p;rtinent only in that it
determines the risk insured against, the right of the plaintiff to recover will be
based on the law relating to cases where through mistake no risk is assumed, 6
or where the risk assumed is very much different from that which' the parties
Lancashire Ins. Co., 27 Ala. App. 384, 173 So. 99 (1937), which followed the rule
that if any part of the risk was assumed no part of the premiums are recoverable, even
though the mistake was entirely chargeable to the insurer.
Another pertinent inquiry in the instant case would be whether the plaintiff
was justified in basing his expectations on the report of the German court ·commissioner. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 172 N. W. 907 (1919).
2 As to the effect of negligence of the party inducing the mistake, see 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1596, note 7 (1937).
8 The contract in the principal case was riot set out, but it is difficult to imagine
an insurance contract covering marine and war risk where no statement as to value of
the goods insured was made. Where the statement of value is substantially greater
than the actual value, even though the misstatement was innocently made it will have
the effect of avoiding the policy. 3 CooLEY, BRIEFS oN INSURANCE, 2d ed., 2103
(1927); Rosser v. Georgia Home Ins. Co.; IOI Ga. 716, 29 S. E. 286 (1897).
4 Roney v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co., 225 Ala. 367, 143 So. 571 (1932).
See note to Holmes v. Payne, [1930] 2 K. B. 301 in 29 MicH. L. REV. 644 (1931)
where the cases on this point are collected.
5 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Vinton, (App. Div. 1921) 190 N. Y. S. 525,
affd. 206 App. Div. 615, 198 N. Y. S. 913 (1923). Contra, Roney v. Commercial
Union Fire Ins. Co., 225 Ala. 367, 143 So. 571 (1932). In Brough v. Presidential
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (La. App. 1937) 176 So. 895, recovery of premiums paid by
the insured was allowed where for breach of condition at the outset the policy was
void ab initio.
6 Taylor v. Sumner, 4 Mass. 56 (1808) (marine insurance was effected against a
blockade then existing around a port of call; no such blockade existed and the insured
was allowed to recover his premiums); Lattarulo v. National Surety Co., II9 Misc.
154, 196 N. Y. S. 98 (1922) (insured purchased a bond necessary for liquor licensees;
he was unable to procure a ~ic'ense and was allowed to recover his premium); Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Brame, II2 Miss. 859, 73 So. 812 (1916) (where beneficiary paid premiums on husband's life for seven years after he disappeared, she was
allowed to recover them on a showing that in fact he died on the date of his disappearance). ,
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thought the insurer was assuming. 7 In general, the rule is that if no risk attaches the premiums are recoverable, but if any risk whatever is assumed even
though it be for a shorter time than was anticipated, or, in the case of indivisible
risks, even though it be of a lesser degree of risk than was anticipated, the
premiums are not recoverable. 8 In the principal case the risks as to the individual items of jewelry were divisible, so it might be said that no legal risk
attached as to the necklace. 9 Nevertheless, since it is obvious that defendant
would have been unable to prove the value, had a loss occurred, the case should
be classed with those in which a risk different from that contemplated was
assumed. The court in the principal case indicates that it prefers to recognize the
real as opposed to the theoretical aspects of the matter and refuses relief to the
plaintiff, invoking the principle that in order to recover for money had and
received the plaintiff must show that it would be against equity and good conscience for the defendant to retain it. The case indicates that the defense that
plaintiff's claim is inequitable, which has hitherto been used principally where
the defendant receiving the money had disbursed it to third parties,1° has a wider
application and is applicable where it is clear to the court that had the mistake
harmed the other party he would have been unable to' avoid liability.

·
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7 Ordinarily this will be a unilateral mistake, such as insured paying premiums on
an employer's liability contract, thinking that the policy covered the whole group of
employees whose wages were the measure of the amount of premium. If the policy
covers some but not all of the employees no recovery may be had. Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Little Rock Railway & Electric Co., 92 Ark. 306, 122 S. W. 994 (1909). If it
covers none of the employees, relief is available. Bituminous Casualty Exchange v.
Ford-Elkhorn Coal Co., 243 Ky. 456, 48 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1932).
8 MAcG1LLIVRAY, INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 960 (1937); 2 CooLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE, 2d ed., 1730 (1927); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1568 (1937).
9 A substantial difference in value becomes a difference in kind. 5 WILLISTON,
CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1570 (1937). Here there was an intent to insure a $60,000
necklace made of real pearls which did not exist. There was no intent to insure a $60
necklace of cultured pearls. Even without reliance on insurance principles, supra, note 3,
it would seem clear that no contract existed.
10 Walker v. United States, (C. C. Ala. 1905) 139 F. 409; Bessler Movable
Stairway Co. v. Bank, 140 Miss. 537, 106 So. 445 (1926).

